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NOTE
What Is Outrageous Government Conduct? The
Washington State Supreme Court Knows It When It
Sees It: State v. Lively
Matthew V Honeywell*
Inability to describe in general terms just what makes tactics too
outrageous to tolerate suggests that there is no definition-and "I know
it when I see it" is not a rule of any kind, let alone a command of the
Due Process Clause.'
For the first time ever, the Supreme Court of Washington in State
v. Lively2 overturned a criminal conviction because of outrageous
government conduct.3 This decision employed a rarely-used, and even
more infrequently successful, defense to achieve an apparently just
result. Indeed, courts and scholars disagree on whether the defense,
based on the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, actually
exists and, if it does, how it applies to the facts of a given case. The
U.S. Supreme Court has neither expressly and conclusively acknowl-
edged nor disavowed the defense and has never employed it to
overturn a criminal conviction. The existence of the outrageous
government conduct defense has been acknowledged by most federal
and state courts. Two federal circuits, however, have expressly
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1. United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1273 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concur-
ring).
2. 130 Wash. 2d 1, 921 P.2d 1035 (1996).
3. The terms "outrageous government conduct defense" and "due process defense" mean
the same thing in this context and will be used interchangeably throughout this Note.
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repudiated it.4 Thus, a conflict in interpreting the U.S. Constitution's
Due Process Clause exists, and the U.S. Supreme Court is the only
place to resolve it.
A representative body of literature has recently evolved discussing
the outrageous government conduct defense; the majority of this
literature favors and advocates its preservation.' A detailed review of
relevant case law, however, will lead to confusion. Many cases that
address the outrageous government conduct defense cite United States
v. Russell's dicta6 in recognizing that the defense exists, but refuse to
hold the conduct at issue sufficiently outrageous to bar the defendant's
conviction. In rejecting a defendant's due process claim, some courts
have subjected their facts and precedents to greater scrutiny by
engaging in lengthier analysis. Nevertheless, the end result is the
same-a successfully asserted due process claim based on outrageous
government conduct is extremely rare.'
So why was the defense successful in State v. Lively? Because
while a precise definition of "outrageous government conduct" is
4. United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d
1420 (6th Cir. 1994); see infra text accompanying notes 39-53.
5. Stephen A. Miller, Comment, The Case for Preserving the Outrageous Government Conduct
Defense, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 305 (1996); Jason R. Schulze, Note, United States v. Tucker: Can
the Sixth Circuit Really Abolish the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV.
943 (1996); John David Baretta, Note, Reconfiguring the Entrapment and Outrageous Conduct
Doctrines, 84 GEO. L.J. 1945 (1996); Mark Jarod Meyers, Note, United States v. Tucker: The
Sixth Circuit Takes Aim at Due Process, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1571 (1995); Conrad F. Meis,
Comment, United States v. Tucker - The Illegitimate Death of the Outrageous Governmental
Conduct Defense, 80 IOWA L. REV. 955 (1995); Dana M. Todd, Note, In Defense of the
Outrageous Government Conduct Defense in the Federal Courts, 84 KY. L.J. 415 (1995); Damon D.
Camp, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United States: Towards a More Balanced
Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1055 (1993); Fred Ward Bennett, From
Sorrells to Jacobson: Reflections on Six Decades of Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses, In
Federal Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829 (1992); Gail M. Greaney, Note, Crossing the
Constitutional Line: Due Process and the Law Enforcement Justification, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
745 (1992); Stephen A. Meister, Comment, When Nothing Is Shocking: The Ninth Circuit
Degrades the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 22 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 843 (1989); Karen
Mausser Poole, Note, When Use of the Entrapment Defense is Barred: Is There a Viable Alternative
Defense? United States v. Simpson, 5 COOLEY L. REV. 203 (1988); Richard Lawrence Daniels,
Note, United States v. Simpson: 'Outrageousness!' What Does It Really Mean?-An Examination
of the Outrageous Conduct Defense, 18 Sw. U. L. REV. 105 (1988).
6. 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973); see also infra text accompanying notes 26-29.
7. See United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d
359 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980); State v. Van Winkle,
864 P.2d 729 (Kan. 1993); State v. Johnson, 606 A.2d 315 (N.J. 1992).
8. Danny A. Veileux, Annotation, Actions by State Officials Involving Defendant as Consti-
tuting 'Outrageous' Conduct Violating Due Process Guarantees, 18 A.L.R. 5TH 1 (1995); Tim A.
Thomas, Annotation, What Conduct of Federal Law Enforcement Authorities in Inducing or Co-
Operating in Criminal Offenses Raises Due Process Defense Distinct from Entrapment, 97 A.L.R.
FED. 273 (1996).
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difficult to articulate, five out of the nine justices hearing the case
apparently felt that the government agent's conduct, in light of all the
surrounding circumstances, was repugnant enough to justify overturn-
ing the defendant's conviction.
The Lively case addresses several questions of law concerning the
defense of entrapment and denial of due process.' Because the court
was in general agreement on the entrapment issues and sharply divided
on due process, this Note will address exclusively the due process
defense, which was dispositive. The Lively majority attempts to clarify
the judicial approach to this issue while reaching a just result. The
dissent, 0 on the other hand, is skeptical of the existence of the due
process defense and the majority's analysis.
Given the amorphous state of the outrageous government conduct
defense, and with little guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court as to its
existence or applicability, courts will continue to apply it as they see
fit in particular cases. If and when the issue is ever considered by the
high Court, it should perhaps look to the Lively case to explicitly
define the doctrine for the benefit of other courts.
Part I of this Note will discuss the background of the outrageous
government conduct defense; Part II will examine the facts of the
Lively case; Part III will analyze the court's decision in Lively; and Part
IV will discuss the policy considerations which precipitated the
outcome. This Note concludes that the outrageous government
conduct defense should continue to be recognized. Courts doing so
should employ a "totality of circumstances" analysis and consider
relevant public policy issues to determine whether a defendant's due
process rights were violated.
9. The entrapment issue centered around which party has the burden of persuasion when
the entrapment defense is asserted. The Lively court held that there was neither a due process
requirement that the state prove the absence of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt nor error
as a result of the trial court instructing the jury that the defendant was required to prove
entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 10-13, 921
P.2d at 1040-42. The court also considered, but did not decide, whether the defendant's
constitutional right of free exercise of religion was violated. Id. at 27, 921 P.2d at 1048. See also
infra note 135.
10. The opinion was actually a concurrence in part and dissent in part. Because the
concurrence was regarding the entrapment issue and the dissent was directed toward the
outrageous government conduct issue, this Note will simply refer to the opinion as a dissent.
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I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT THE OUTRAGEOUS
GOVERNMENT CONDUCT DEFENSE
A. Historical Background
The defense of outrageous government conduct has a close
relationship to the defense of entrapment, as both are products of the
same U.S. Supreme Court case law" and appear to be inextricably
intertwined. Thus, to examine the defense of outrageous government
conduct, one must first examine the defense of entrapment.
Of the many available definitions of entrapment, the most
enduring is that offered by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States:
"Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an
officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not
have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the
officer."12  The entrapment defense, born in 1932 in Sorrells,'3
matured in 1958 in Sherman v. United States. 4 While the justices in
both cases agreed on the results, they could not agree on the method
to reach them. Thus, from these opinions came the "objective" and
"subjective" views of the entrapment defense.
The subjective view 5 of entrapment, the majority view, employs
11. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423
(1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952);
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
12. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 454. The Lively court cites a line of Washington cases stating that
the defense of entrapment occurs when
the accused is lured or induced by an officer of the law or some other person, a decoy
or informer, to commit a crime which he had no intention of committing. Such defense
is not available when the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the
police officers, through decoys and informers, merely afford the accused an opportunity
to commit the offense.
Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 9, 921 P.2d at 1039.
13. In Sorrells, an undercover prohibition agent had asked the defendant to obtain a prohib-
ited alcoholic beverage for him. Despite the defendant's initial refusal, the agent persisted with
several more requests. Also, the agent appealed to the defendant's sense of camaraderie, as both
men were World War veterans. Eventually the defendant sold the agent a half-gallon of whiskey
and was indicted for violating the National Prohibition Act. 287 U.S. at 439-41.
14. In Sherman, the defendant met a government informer in a doctor's office, where both
men were seeking treatment for their narcotics addictions. The informer asked Sherman if he
knew where to find a source of narcotics, claiming that he was not responding to treatment.
Sherman repeatedly sought to avoid the issue, but the informer persisted and claimed to be in
significant pain. Through repeated pleas, the informer induced Sherman to obtain narcotics for
him and led Sherman to resume his own drug habit. Shortly thereafter, Sherman was arrested
when supplying narcotics to the informant. 356 U.S. at 371-72.
15. Also known as the "majority view," "federal approach," or "Sherman-Sorrells doctrine."
See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, § 5.2, at
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a two-step inquiry: A court first looks at whether the offense was
induced by a government agent and, second, whether the defendant
was predisposed to commit the type of offense charged. 6 A defen-
dant is considered to be predisposed if he or she is "ready and willing
to commit the crimes such as are charged in the indictment, whenever
the opportunity was afforded."1 7 If the defendant is predisposed, a
defense of entrapment will fail.
On the other hand, the objective view"8 of entrapment, employed
in a small minority of cases, focuses on the inducements used by
government agents. Entrapment is established if police induced or
encouraged the offense by "employing methods of persuasion or
inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be
committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it."' 9
In applying the test, it is necessary to consider the surrounding
circumstances, such as evidence of the manner in which the particular
criminal activity is usually conducted. While some practices may be
impermissible in certain instances, each case must be judged on its own
facts. 20
There are three key distinctions between the entrapment and the
outrageous government conduct defenses. First, entrapment is a
question of fact for the jury while outrageous government conduct is
a question of law for the court.2' Second, the doctrines emanate from
two different sources. Entrapment is a common law doctrine at the
federal level but is based upon statutes at the state level.22  Outra-
geous government conduct, however, is a constitutional question at
either the state or federal level, though some state constitutions could
599 (1986).
16. See id. at 600.
17. Id. at 600 (citing 1 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS § 13.09 (3d ed. 1977); Harrison v. State, 442 A.2d 1377 (Del. 1982)).
18. Also known as the "hypothetical person approach" or the "Roberts-Frankfurter
approach." See 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 600-01.
19. 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 601 (citing Model Penal Code § 2.13).
20. See id.
21. State v. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 19, 921 P.2d at 1044 (citing United States v. Dudden,
65 F.3d 1461, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1995)).
22. The entrapment defense is codified in Washington as title 9A, chapter 16, section 070,
of the Washington Revised Code [hereinafter RCW § 9A.16.070], which states:
(1) In any prosecution for a crime, it is a defense that:
(a) The criminal design originated in the mind of law enforcement officials, or any
person acting under their direction, and
(b) The actor was lured or induced to commit a crime which the actor had not otherwise
intended to commit.
(2) The defense of entrapment is not established by a showing only that law
enforcement officials merely afforded the actor an opportunity to commit a crime.
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have more expansive definitions of "due process of law." 23  Third,
and most significantly, the focus of inquiry for an entrapment defense
is a defendant's predisposition to commit the crime charged, while the
focus of an outrageous government conduct defense is the conduct or
role of a law enforcement agent in the commission of the crime.24
This final distinction is the most controversial-it is the "subjective"
versus "objective" debate on the entrapment defense that has been
waged by courts and commentators for years. In fact, one of the chief
arguments advanced by critics of the due process defense is that it is
merely the objective view of entrapment disguised as a different
defense.25
The outrageous government conduct defense was born with Justice
Rehnquist's dicta in United States v. Russell.26  In Russell, Justice
Rehnquist began his opinion with the following: "While we may some
day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to
obtain a conviction, the instant case is distinctly not of that breed. "27
He later added: "The law enforcement conduct here stops far short of
23. The language of the Due Process Clauses of the federal and Washington state
constitutions are substantially the same. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V ("... . nor shall any
person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"), and U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law"), with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3 ("No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). See generally PAUL MARCUS, THE
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE, § 7.11 (2d ed. 1995).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
25. United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1421; United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d at 3
("Outrageous misconduct is the deathbed child of objective entrapment, a doctrine long since
discarded in the federal courts"). But see Rivera v. State, 846 P.2d 1, 7 (Wyo. 1993).
26. 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (An FBI agent convinced Russell and his codefendants that he
represented a Pacific Northwest organization interested in controlling the manufacture and
distribution of methamphetamine. The agent agreed to provide them with phenyl-2-proanone,
a difficult-to-obtain chemical essential to the manufacture of methamphetamine, in exchange for
one-half of the drug produced in the defendant's Whidbey Island laboratory. After the
completion of this and one other transaction, the defendants were arrested upon execution of a
search warrant. Despite the contention that supplying the chemical made the government an
active participant in the crime, the Court held that the defendants were dearly predisposed, as
they had already been producing methamphetamine before the FBI agent's involvement, and thus
the criminal design had not been implanted in the minds of the defendants.).
27. Id. at 431-42 (comparing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), a case in which
deputy sheriffs, having information about the defendant selling narcotics, broke into his home and
forcibly attempted to extract from him a capsule he had swallowed. After the defendant's
stomach was pumped in the hospital, two capsules of morphine were eventually found and
subsequently presented at trial to obtain a conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the




violating that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
justice,' mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment."28 Justice Rehnquist did caution, however, that
[s]everal decisions of the United States district courts and courts of
appeals have undoubtedly gone beyond this Court's opinions in
Sorrells and Sherman in order to bar prosecutions because of what
they thought to be, for want of a better term, "overzealous law
enforcement." But the defense of entrapment enunciated in those
opinions was not intended to give the federal judiciary a "chancel-
lor's foot" veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not
approve.29
Two years later, in Hampton v. United States,3" Justice Rehnquist
tried to recant his dicta in Russell.3 While the Court's likely motive
in granting certiorari in Hampton was clarification of its position in
Russell, the Hampton decision instead created more confusion. The
case was decided by a plurality, with a minority siding with Rehn-
quist's recantation but the majority of justices agreeing that they did
not want to foreclose the possibility of a due process defense by state
and federal courts.32
In the twenty years since Russell and Hampton, the doctrine of
outrageous government conduct has been applied haphazardly by state
and federal courts. The U.S. Supreme Court appears reluctant,
28. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432 (quoting Kinsellar v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
234, 246 (1960)).
29. Id. at 435.
30. 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (The defendant was convicted for distributing narcotics when he
sold heroin, which had been supplied to him by a government informant, to a government agent.
The defendant conceded that he was predisposed to commit the crime, so the entrapment defense
was unavailable to him.).
31. Id. at 490.
The limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment come into play only
when the Government activity in question violates some protected right of the
[d]efendant. Here, as we have noted, the police, the Government informant, and the
defendant acted in concert with one another. If the result of the governmental activity
is to "implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged
offense and induce its commission .. ," the defendant is protected by the defense of
entrapment. If the police engage in illegal activity in concert with the defendant beyond
the scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant,
but in prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or federal law.
Id. (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 491, 495 (Justices Powell and Blackmun concurred in the result, but maintained
that a due process defense based on outrageous government conduct would be available in the
appropriate case. Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall dissented, restating their support of the
objective view of entrapment and asserting that the police conduct in the case was sufficiently
offensive to bar Hampton's conviction.).
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however, to resume the "objective" versus "subjective" entrapment
debate, which would invariably arise if it were to consider a claim of
outrageous government conduct.
B. Application in Practice and Recent Treatment by the Courts
Since its birth in 1974, the outrageous government conduct
defense has seen very limited practical application. A vast majority of
cases where it is raised are narcotics-related prosecutions.33 In many
of these cases the government has used informants, and it is generally
the informants' conduct in the course of the investigation that is
challenged by the defendant on due process grounds.34 The "war on
drugs" is a high government priority. Therefore, there has been great
judicial reluctance to interfere with law enforcement efforts to combat
drug-related activity.3s
The use of informants is a necessary method of law enforcement
and unquestionably sanctioned by the judiciary.36 The clandestine
nature of drug crime demands that law enforcement agencies use
informants to infiltrate ongoing narcotics activity to help arrest and
prosecute drug manufacturers and dealers.37 Informants, however,
often have self-serving motives for providing authorities with informa-
tion and, because they are largely unsupervised, will go to great lengths
to detect illegal activity to report.38 Courts have stated that they do
not approve of particular law enforcement methods and used phrases
such as "reprehensible," "repugnant," and "offensive" to describe
them, but nonetheless have upheld the convictions.
39
While the outrageous government conduct defense is predominate-
ly asserted in narcotics prosecutions, it has been asserted in other
contexts.4 ° In fact, it was within the context of cases involving food
33. See Veilleux, supra note 8, at 1; 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 598.
34. See Veilleux, supra note 8, at 27.
35. See State v. Pleasant, 38 Wash. App. 78, 83, 684 P.2d 761, 764 (1984) (" ... the
Supreme Court has stated that it is unlikely a due process violation will ever be found in the
context of contraband offenses: the detection of such offenses requires law enforcement officials
to resort to covert methods which would be unacceptable in other contexts.").
36. See Veilleux, supra note 8, at 101-17; Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of
Informants: A History of Abuses and Suggestions for Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 83-
86, 105 (1994).
37. See Veilleux, supra note 8, at 90-95.
38. See Zimmerman, supra note 36, at 99-102, 116, 138-39.
39. See Veilleux, supra note 8, at 30-31.
40. Other examples of crimes that authorities use undercover agents or informants to
investigate include: prostitution, child pornography, insurance fraud, credit card fraud,
counterfeiting, weapons transportation, transportation of illegal aliens, possession and
transportation of stolen goods, bribery, corrupt influencing, witness tampering and official
[Vol. 21:689
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stamp trafficking and prosecutorial misconduct that two federal circuit
courts specifically repudiated the outrageous government conduct
defense. 4' These decisions have thus altered the nature of the conflict
between the circuits. Where once the federal courts disagreed on the
application of the defense, they now disagree on its very existence.
1. Federal Courts
In United States v. Tucker,42 the two defendants were arrested for
food stamp trafficking during a government sting operation. The
government employed an agent, who worked on "'commission' of
sorts, '43 where she kept half the money she collected from the sale of
food stamps. She was not told whom to approach, merely that she
should find people willing to buy the food stamps below face value and
secretly record the transactions.44 The agent contacted Tucker, a
friend of more than ten years, and claimed that she was in dire
financial need.4" She claimed that she was selling her food stamps so
that she could provide a "proper Christmas" for her children.46
Tucker initially resisted, but eventually purchased the stamps when the
agent came to her workplace "dressed in a manner suggesting extreme
financial distress."47 The agent then convinced Hancock, an employ-
ee of Tucker's and the other defendant in this case, to buy stamps after
telling her "tales of ill-health and financial need. a"4 ' The defendants
convinced the district court to dismiss the case based on the govern-
ment's aggressive overinvolvement in the crime.49
The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that outrageous government
conduct defense was nothing more than a claim of entrapment. In
doing so, the court rejected all previous Sixth Circuit precedent that
had considered the defense: "In our view ... there is no authority in
this circuit which holds that the government's conduct in inducing the
commission of a crime, if 'outrageous' enough, can bar prosecution of
an otherwise predisposed defendant under the Due Process Clause of
misconduct. See Veilleux, supra note 8, at 144-86; Thomas, supra note 8, at 303-41.
41. United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d
1420 (6th Cir. 1994).
42. 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994).
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the Fifth Amendment."" °  One of the concurring judges disagreed
with the majority's total disregard for its precedents by no longer
recognizing the due process defense, stating: "It seems clear to me that
this Circuit has recognized outrageous government conduct as a valid
due process defense, and, as the majority concedes, the Supreme Court
has not clearly held otherwise."'"
One year later, in United States v. Boyd, the government appealed
a district court's order granting new trials for members of the "El
Rukns," an infamous Chicago street gang, based upon prosecutorial
misconduct. 2 The government had knowingly allowed two of their
witnesses to perjure themselves at trial and had withheld from the
defense evidence that all six witnesses had used illegal drugs and
received unlawful favors from the government prosecutors and their
staffs." Prosecutors had also allowed the prisoner witnesses to
entertain their visitors in the U.S. Attorney's office in the federal
building, as well as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
offices across the street.54 During these unsupervised visits, the
witnesses had consumed alcohol and illegal drugs (brought by their
predominantly female guests), had engaged in sexual intercourse, had
utilized unlimited telephone privileges, and had stolen numerous
documents.55 The trial court granted new trials because the outra-
geous prosecutorial conduct was uniquely egregious.
Writing for the Seventh Circuit which considered the defendant's
appeal, Judge Posner stated:
Prosecutorial misconduct may precipitate a reversible error, but it is
never in itself a reversible error. In great tension with this principle,
there are intimations that "outrageous government misconduct" is
an independent ground for ordering a new trial in a federal criminal
case; but we agree with the First Circuit that "the doctrine [of
outrageous government misconduct] is moribund." "Stillborn"
might be a better term, for it never had any life; and it certainly has
no support in the decisions of this court, which go out of their way
to criticize the doctrine. Today we let the other shoe drop, and hold
that the doctrine does not exist in this circuit.56
50. Id. at 1424.
51. Id. at 1429-30.
52. 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995).
53. Id. at 241.
54. Id. at 244.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 241 (citations omitted).
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While the outrageous government conduct defense was repudiated
by two federal circuits in nondrug offenses, the consideration of its
viability in the Washington courts has occurred in both drug and
nondrug cases.
2. Washington Courts
Prior to the legislative adoption of the entrapment defense in
1975, the Washington Court of Appeals considered the Russell decision
and held in two separate cases that the majority view of entrapment
was controlling.17 Thus, in State v. Emerson, the court held that the
police conduct during the course of its investigation, in which an
undercover officer engaged in sex with several prostitutes which he
paid for with public funds, was not conduct that violated the "funda-
mental sense of fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.""
The same court examined the entrapment and due process defenses
several months later in State v. Walker and held that the entrapment
defense was properly rejected by the jury where there was insufficient
evidence of government inducement and that the due process defense
did not apply where there was no showing of outrageous police
misconduct."
After the adoption of the entrapment defense in 1975, a line of
appellate decisions repeatedly rejected claims of outrageous government
conduct.6" While not recognizing a due process violation in the cases
57. State v. Emerson, 10 Wash. App. 235, 517 P.2d 245 (1974); State v. Walker, 11 Wash.
App. 84, 521 P.2d 215 (1974).
58. Emerson, 10 Wash. App. at 242, 517 P.2d at 249.
59. Walker, 11 Wash. App. at 88-90, 521 P.2d at 218-19.
60. State v. Brooks, 30 Wash. App. 280, 633 P.2d 1345 (1981) (defendant convicted of
burglary and possession of stolen property in connection with a federally-funded sting operation);
State v. Keller, 30 Wash. App. 644, 637 P.2d 985 (1981) (case remanded because trial court erred
in refusing to give defendant's proposed entrapment instruction to the jury holding that evidence
of police officer's inducement of defendant to sell marijuana was proper in consideration of
entrapment defense and not necessary to prove a violation of due process, where no such
constitutional claim had been raised); State v. Putnam, 31 Wash. App. 156, 639 P.2d 858 (1982)
(holding that the police investigatory technique of planting a civilian agent and telling her to do
whatever was necessary to gather evidence of prostitution was not so outrageous as to require
dismissal or suppression of evidence, and that illegal conduct by the police or its agents was not
sufficient by itself to justify dismissal on due process grounds, although it could reach such a level
of outrageousness that dismissal of resulting criminal charges would be required); State v. Jessup,
31 Wash. App. 304, 641 P.2d 1185 (1982) (where the defendant had been convicted of charges
arising out of the same criminal enterprise as Putnam, the court examined the conduct of the
police agent in greater detail, holding that the police tactics used to obtain evidence were not so
shocking to the universal sense of justice as to require dismissal or suppression of state agent's
testimony); Playhouse Corp. v. Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 35 Wash. App. 539, 667
P.2d 1136 (1983) (holding that the conduct of the board's investigating officers, who never
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before them, the courts did not foreclose the possibility of dismissing
a prosecution based on outrageous government conduct.61
In 1984, the outrageous government conduct defense was first
considered by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Myers.62
The defendant appealed his conviction of heroin possession with intent
to manufacture and deliver, where the police had gained entry into his
home using a fictitious arrest warrant to execute a valid search
warrant.63 In its decision, the court adhered to Justice Rehnquist's
recantation language in Hampton, holding that to show a due process
violation, it must be shown that the challenged government activity
violated a specific constitutional right of the defendant.64 The court
then examined whether the defendant's constitutional right to privacy
was violated.6" Although the majority expressed concern over the
tactics used, it nevertheless held that no due process violation had
occurred.66
The Court of Appeals next analyzed the outrageous government
conduct defense in State v. Rundquist.6 7  The defendant was prose-
cuted for knowingly purchasing unlawfully taken salmon and steelhead
from an undercover agent. The trial court interrupted the state's case
in chief and dismissed all charges, based on its supervisory powers,
finding that the government agents had deprived the defendant of his
right to due process of law.68 The appellate court cited several
analogous situations in which courts had refused to find a due process
identified themselves as board investigators to defendant's tavern management, purchased "table
dances" with public funds, and did not inform tavern's management of violations prior to the
initiation of a complaint, was not conduct "shocking to the universal sense of justice."); State v.
Pleasant, 38 Wash. App. 78, 684 P.2d 761 (1984) (where the defendant had been convicted of
selling marijuana to an undercover police officer participating in a "sting" operation, in which the
police department set up a bogus construction employment operation and applicants were solicited
for drug purchases by the interviewer, the court held that the mere instigation of crime was not
outrageous in the context of contraband offenses and compared the activity with that in Hampton
in concluding that the conduct of the Tacoma Police Department was not sufficiently outrageous
to bar prosecution of the defendant).
61. See cases cited supra note 60.
62. 102 Wash. 2d 548, 689 P.2d 38 (1984).
63. Id. at 549-51, 689 P.2d at 39-40.
64. Id. at 551, 689 P.2d at 40-41.
65. Id. at 551-56, 689 P.2d at 40-43.
66. Id. at 557, 689 P.2d at 44. See also id. at 558-59, 689 P.2d at 44-45 (Rosellini, J.,
concurring). But see id. at 559-60, 689 P.2d at 45-46 (Dimmick, J., concurring).
67. 79 Wash. App. 786, 905 P.2d 922 (1995), rev. denied, 129 Wash. 2d 1003, 914 P.2d
66 (1996). This opinion was cited with approval by the dissent in State v. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d
at 30-31, 921 P.2d at 1050.
68. Myers at 788, 905 P.2d at 923.
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violation based on outrageous government conduct.69 The court also
cited several Washington cases that declined to find a due process
violation.70 In following Hampton and Myers, the court stated that its
inquiry "must focus on the issue of the defendant's rights, not on [its]
evaluation of police conduct."'" Without concluding whether the
outrageous government conduct defense actually existed, the court held
that, if it did, it should be applied sparingly under only the most
egregious circumstances and that the facts in the present case were not
sufficiently outrageous to bar prosecution.72
Prior to Rundquist, the court of appeals considered the outrageous
conduct defense in State v. Valentine.73 The Valentine defendant's
conviction for third degree assault was affirmed over a vigorous
dissent, which claimed that the facts strongly suggested Valentine was
provoked into a confrontation by the police officers who arrested
him.74 The appeal was argued before the Supreme Court prior to the
Lively decision, but the opinion was rendered after Lively.7" The
outrageous government conduct defense was raised by Valentine before
the Supreme Court, even though it had been raised neither at trial, nor,
on appeal.76 The issue of outrageous government conduct, in fact,
had been identified by the dissenting judge in his appellate court
opinion.77 The Supreme Court, after engaging in an exhaustive
analysis on the issue of resistance to unlawful arrest, briefly reviewed
and rejected the outrageous government conduct claim before
concluding that there was not an adequate factual record to evaluate
the police conduct.78 While opinions may differ as to the existence
and viability of the outrageous government conduct defense, those who
69. Id. at 795, 905 P.2d at 926. The court cites as examples: State v. DeAngelo, 830 P.2d
630, 632-33 (Or. App. 1992) (due process defense rejected where police sold allegedly illegal fish
to a restaurant); Vaden v. Alaska, 768 P.2d 1102, 1103, 1108 (Alaska 1989) (denying due process
defense when a federal agent illegally shot foxes from the defendant guide's aircraft); United States
v. Ivey, 949 F.2d 759, 762-63, 769 (5th Cir. 1991) (denying due process defense where federal
agents sold illegally imported bobcat hides and provided false forms intended to show that the
hides were legal); United States v. Stenberg, 803 F.2d 422, 430-31 (9th Cir. 1986) (denying due
process defense where agents were actively involved in killing wildlife).
70. Rundquist, 79 Wash. App. at 795-96, 905 P.2d 926-27 (citingJessup, Emerson, Brooks,
and Pleasant, supra note 60).
71. Id. at 796, 905 P.2d at 926.
72. Id. at 797-98, 905 P.2d at 927-28.
73. 75 Wash. App. 611, 879 P.2d 313 (1994).
74. Id. at 621-25, 879 P.2d at 319-21 (Schultheis, J., dissenting); see also id. at 619-21, 879
P.2d at 318-19.
75. State v. Valentine, 132 Wash. 2d 1, 935 P.2d 1294 (1997).
76. Id. at 22, 25, 935 P.2d at 1304, 1306 (Smith, J., concurring).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 22-24, 935 P.2d at 1304-05.
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
have acknowledged its existence agree that it should only be considered
in the rarest of circumstances; indeed, the Lively case presents a unique
factual scenario.
II. THE FACTS OF THE LIVELY CASE
In November 1992, Amy Lively was tried and convicted of two
counts of delivery of a controlled substance. She did not deny making
deliveries of cocaine but asserted the defense of entrapment.79 Upon
direct review, the Washington Supreme Court was in general agree-
ment that the defendant had the burden of proving that she was
entrapped and that, when viewing the evidence presented at trial in a
light most favorable to the state, a reasonable jury could have found
that the defendant was not entrapped. 0 In a 5-4 decision, however,
the court held that the actions of the state constituted outrageous
government conduct violating Lively's due process rights, and on this
basis overturned her conviction.
Despite having no criminal record, Lively had led a troubled life.
She started using cocaine and drinking alcohol at the age of fourteen.
At fifteen, she stopped using cocaine because she was pregnant. By
eighteen, she had two children, a husband stationed in Korea, and she
began to drink heavily. After attempting to quit drinking on her own,
Lively admitted herself into a detoxification program. Upon complet-
ing the program, she began attending Alcoholics Anonymous/
Narcotics Anonymous meetings (hereinafter AA/NA). In March
1991, Lively voluntarily admitted herself into a 28-day inpatient
treatment program after relapsing on alcohol."1 After completing the
program, Lively was emotionally distraught and attempted suicide.
Shortly thereafter, she met Kamlesh "Koby" Desai.
In early 1991, Desai was hired as an informant by the Walla
Walla City/County Drug Unit. In exchange for his work, Desai was
provided with an apartment, car, and other living expenses. The terms
of his employment contract were that he not break any criminal laws,
not use narcotics and that he stay in daily communication with the
drug unit. With the knowledge and approval of the drug unit
detectives, Desai began attending AA/NA meetings in an effort to
79. State v. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 5, 921 P.2d at 1037-38 (1996).
80. Id. at 18, 921 P.2d at 1044 ("Despite this considerable evidence of entrapment, however,
a review of all the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the State leads us to conclude
that a rational trier of fact could have found that the Defendant failed to prove entrapment by a
preponderance of the evidence.").
81. Id. at 5-6, 921 P.2d at 1036.
[Vol. 21:689702
Outrageous Government Conduct
identify repeat drug addicts who continued to sell illegal drugs.8 2 It
was at an AA/NA meeting in mid-April that Desai and Lively met for
the first time.
According to Lively, Desai asked her out on a date two weeks
after their initial meeting. 3 She subsequently maintained a relation-
ship with him "because he was very supportive and responsive to her
emotional needs."84  Shortly thereafter, according to Lively, they
began a sexual relationship, they started cohabitating, and, in late June,
Desai proposed marriage to her. 5 It was during this time that Desai
first asked her if she could get cocaine for his good friend "Rick," who
was actually a detective. Lively testified that Desai repeated this
request a dozen times a day for two weeks until she eventually agreed
to purchase cocaine, and that she had done so only because of her
emotional reliance on him.86
Desai, however, disagreed with much of Lively's testimony at
trial, denying asking her to buy cocaine for his friend and asserting that
it was Lively who initially brought up the subject of obtaining drugs,
volunteering to do so through one of her connections.8 7 Furthermore,
Desai claimed that he and Lively never dated nor engaged in sex. He
admitted allowing her to stay at his apartment in a separate room. He
claimed that Lively had initiated the topic of marriage, but he had
never proposed to her nor had he offered to help her obtain a divorce
from her husband. 8 While Lively testified that she was not using
drugs at the time of the offenses, Desai claimed that he saw her use
cocaine on three separate occasions.8 9
Before submitting the case to the jury, the defendant Lively
proposed an instruction that the absence of entrapment was an element
of the offense which the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court disagreed and instructed the jury that the defendant had to
prove the existence of entrapment by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.9" The defendant then moved for a directed verdict, contending
that no rational trier of fact could fail to find that she was entrapped.
The court denied her motion.91 After the jury returned a guilty
82. Id. at 6, 921 P.2d at 1036.




87. Id. at 7-8, 921 P.2d at 1038-39.
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verdict on both counts, the defendant filed motions for an arrest of
judgment and for a new trial. The court also denied these motions.92
At sentencing, however, the trial judge departed from the standard
sentence range and gave Lively an exceptionally lenient sentence.93
In support of this exceptional sentence, the judge made several findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Chief among these were that Desai
lacked credibility as a witness and that Lively, lacking any apparent
predisposition to do so, was induced by Desai to commit a criminal
offense.94
III. ANALYSIS OF MAJORITY AND DISSENTING
OPINIONS IN LIVELY
In evaluating whether the government agent's conduct violated the
defendant's due process rights, the majority analyzed the facts based
on several factors, which were a hybrid of tests previously employed




94. Id. at 15-16, 921 P.2d at 1042-43 (Judge Reser made the following findings of facts in
support of the exceptional sentence:
1. The defendant Amy Lively has no criminal history prior to the events of this case.
2. The defendant had previously had a cocaine problem and had attended an inpatient
treatment program to eliminate that problem.
3. The State's confidential informant, Kamlesh Desai, met the defendant at an NA
meeting. Desai is a clever, deceitful person, having passed approximately 30 bad
checks. The informant lied in court and showed no remorse.
4. Prior to the alleged incidents herein the defendant and the State's confidential
informant lived together.
5. The State's confidential informant requested the defendant to obtain cocaine for
him on a number of occasions.
6. The defendant did not seek anyone to whom to sell cocaine, but was sought out.
The two deliveries were made at the request of Desai and were 1 gram each.
7. After the deliveries herein, the State's confidential informant asked the defendant
to marry him.
8. The defendant would be subject to a clearly excessive sentence in ... light of the
purpose of chapter 9.94a.
[9.]
10. The court finds as fact that the defendant, with no apparent predisposition to do
so, was induced by others specifically Kamlesh Desai to participate in the crime of
delivery of a controlled substance.
Clerk's Papers at 146-47.).
Id.
95. See infra notes 96-100.
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(1) whether the police conduct instigated a crime or merely
infiltrated ongoing criminal activity;"
(2) whether the defendant's reluctance to commit a crime was
overcome by pleas of sympathy, promises of excessive profits, or
persistent solicitation;
97
(3) whether the government controls the criminal activity or simply
allows for the criminal activity to occur;9
(4) whether the police motive was to prevent crime or protect the
public;99 and
(5) whether the government conduct itself amounted to criminal
activity or conduct "repugnant to a sense of justice."'10
This analysis examines the totality of the government conduct in light
of the surrounding circumstances, rather than viewing each distinct
government act by itself. The court then reviewed the facts of the
Lively case and held that the conduct of the police, via their informant,
satisfied all five elements. 0 1
The dissent reasonably questioned the notion of applying a bright-
line rule or standard to purposefully vague constitutional notions like
due process of law 02 The dissent also claimed that the majority
"concoct[ed] a five-part test to determine if police conduct is so
outrageous as to require reversal of conviction based on a violation of
due process."'0 3  However, the majority merely outlined factors for
a court to consider in evaluating such conduct, none of which is
96. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 22, 921 P.2d at 1045 (citing United States v. Harris, 997 F.2d
812, 816 (10th Cir. 1993)).
97. Id. at 22, 921 P.2d at 1046 (citing People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83 (N.Y. 1978);
State v. Shannon, 892 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Mo. 1995)).
98. Id. (citing United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1979)).
99. Id. (citing Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d at 83; Shannon, 892 S.W.2d at 765.)
100. Id. (citing Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d at 83; United States v. Jensen, 69 F.3d 906, 910-11
(8th Cir. 1995)).
101. The court found that all five factors were satisfied: (1) in describing the informant's
attendance at AA/NA meetings as "trolling for targets," the court held that with no information
linking Lively to criminal activity the police conduct amounted to instigating crime; (2) finding
that the emotional reliance of the defendant on the informant was an integral part of the
informant's control of the situation, the court held that the trial court's findings of fact dearly
supported a conclusion that the defendant's reluctance to commit a crime were overcome by the
state; (3) the court found that the conduct of the informant was so dosely related to the actions
of the defendant that the informant controlled the criminal activity from start to finish; (4) the
facts supported the condusion that the police motive was not to prevent crime or protect the
public; and (5) the court found that the informant's conduct was repugnant to a sense of justice,
asserting that the police conduct was "contrary to public policy and to basic principles of human
decency." Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 22-26, 921 P.2d at 1046-48.
102. Id. at 31, 921 P.2d at 1050.
103. Id.
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dispositive.' °  Employing this method provides substantially more
guidance to potential prosecutors, defendants, and courts than vague
and abstract definitions like "shocking to universal sense of jus-
tice."1'05 The identification of significant factors can only serve to aid
consistent analysis and rulings. Further, these factors at least put
government actors on notice as to the sort of examination to which
their conduct could be subjected. Previously, a defendant asserting a
due process claim could only hope that the facts were sufficient to
"shock the conscience" of the court, so shocking that the court would
ignore the laundry list of questionable conduct that was found not to
be "outrageous. '"106
While the list of factors may not be exhaustive, the factors are
sufficient in light of the factual circumstances of many cases in which
the defendant asserts a due process defense.0 7 To be sure, the court
makes several disclaimers, stating, for example, that the court "should
evaluate the conduct based on the 'totality of the circumstances'," and
that "each case must be resolved on its own unique set of facts;" ' 8
and "[d]ismissal based on outrageous conduct is reserved for only the
most egregious circumstances," and "is not to be invoked each time the
government acts deceptively." 2 9
Indeed, the court's treatment of the factual record provides a
controversial aspect of this decision. The dissent levels a justifiable
criticism that the majority has essentially retried the case. 10 A
104. Id. at 22, 921 P.2d at 1046.
105. See supra text accompanying note 28.
106. See State v. Valentine, 132 Wash. 2d 1, 38, 935 P.2d 1294, 1313 (1997) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).
(T]he conscience of many jurists is not easily shocked. Many courts have set the bar
so high that only giants may leap to state a due process claim based on outrageous
police misconduct, which is not established merely upon a showing of... even flagrant
misconduct on the part of the police ....
Id.
This generalized acceptance by the judiciary of law enforcement excesses threatens to
undermine the integrity upon which our criminal justice system is based. The fact that
other courts have developed a high shock threshold in the face of reprehensible law
enforcement conduct does not persuade me that this court should sanction what
transpired here.
Valentine, 75 Wash. App. at 625, 879 P.2d at 321 (Schultheis, J., dissenting).
107. See State v. Pollard, 941 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Mo. 1997); State v. Houston, 475 S.E.2d
307 (W. Va. 1996).
108. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 21, 921 P.2d at 1046.
109. Id. at 20, 921 P.2d at 1045.
110. In reversing Lively's conviction, the dissent claims that "the majority substitutes its
judgment for that of the jury" and that "the majority necessarily anoints itself factf'mder while
usurping the role of the jury." Id. at 28, 33, 921 P.2d at 1049, 1051.
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skeptic reading the court's decision may wonder if the oft-quoted
maxim of "tough facts make bad law" is at work in this decision.
Clearly, the majority and dissenting opinions disagree on which facts
should be considered. In reviewing the defendant's claim of insuffi-
cient evidence to support a determination that she was not entrapped,
the majority refused to take the trial judge's findings of fact into
consideration."' On the due process claim, however, the majority
relied on these findings of fact to resolve disputed facts, much to the
dismay of the dissent."2
However, it would seem the majority's use of the facts is justified
considering the question of law and question of fact distinctions
between the entrapment and outrageous government conduct defenses.
Thus, the court was forced to evaluate the conflicting accounts of the
facts in a light most favorable to the State for reviewing the entrapment
defense claim, while it was free to use the trial judge's findings of fact
for evaluating the due process claim, which is a question of law."
13
Nevertheless, in a subsequent opinion, the Washington Supreme Court
questioned the propriety of resolving disputed facts in this manner.
14
In criticizing the majority opinion, the Lively dissent arguably
misstates case law in one instance, while failing to utilize case law in
another. In the process, it claims the majority failed to develop facts
of cited cases, stating:
111. Id. at 16, 921 P.2d at 1043.
112. Id. at 28, 33, 921 P.2d at 1049, 1051.
113. Also, this controversy highlights one of the primary criticisms of the subjective view
of entrapment: A defendant asserting an entrapment defense must admit that he or she
committed the crime charged, and then affirmatively prove that they were entrapped. In proving
entrapment, the defendant must show that they were not "predisposed" to committing the crime
and put their own character at issue. Thus, once the entrapment defense is asserted, many of the
rules of evidence concerning prior bad acts or reputation are ignored and the State is then able
to present highly prejudicial evidence against the defendant that may or may not outweigh its
probative value. See United States v. Russell 411 U.S. 423, 443-44 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); 1 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 606-07.
114. The majority opinion in State v. Valentine states:
At this level, that question [whether a prosecution should be dismissed for outrageous
conduct] should be viewed as a question of law that is to be based on the facts of the
case. Those facts, however, are not to be resolved at the appellate court, nor should we
view them in a light most favorable to the defendant. Resolution of factual disputes is
a task for the trier of fact, not this court ...
Valentine, 132 Wash. 2d at 23, 935 P.2d at 1305. Additionally, a concurring opinion states: "We
are committed in appellate courts to following established rules of procedure and law. This
sometimes results in 'blinders' which obscure the reality of circumstances in cases before us. This
is one such case." Id. at 25, 935 P.2d at 1306 (Smith, J., concurring). See also State v. Jeannotte,
133 Wash. 2d 847, 854-55, 947 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1997) (citing Lively in its discussion of the
propriety of a trial court using a failed entrapment defense as a mitigating factor in imposing an
exceptional sentence).
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While the majority relies on Harris,"'5 Shannon,116 Corcione,1 7
Jensen,11 and Isaacson"9 to further its analysis, it fails to discuss
these cases in any detail. This omission probably stems from the
fact that these cases lend little or no support for the majority's five-
115. United States v. Harris, 997 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1993) (The defendant was charged
with two counts of aiding and abetting and distribution of crack cocaine. The charges were
dismissed sua sponte, on outrageous government conduct grounds, by the District Court. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that, because the undercover officer gave
the defendant, who acted as a middleman between the officer and the defendant's drug dealer, a
relatively small amount of cocaine as compensation for three transactions was not "outrageous
government conduct" barring defendant's prosecution on due process grounds; the court
nevertheless remanded the case to determine whether the government violated the defendant's due
process rights by relying on a known addiction to carry out multiple transactions with the primary
purpose of stacking charges.).
116. State v. Shannon, 892 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1995) (Defendant set up a drug transaction
for an informant and an undercover agent. During the course of the transaction, the agent told
the defendant to attempt to negotiate a better deal for the drugs, allowed the defendant to try
some of the drugs they had just obtained (while the agent declined to try them, claiming he would
do some later, and the informant "simulated" taking the drug), and gave the defendant a small
portion of the drug as payment for setting up the transaction. The court held that the actions of
the agent were reasonable, as they were done to maintain his "cover" and keep his true identity
as a police officer concealed.).
117. United States v. Corcione, 592 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1979) (Defendants were convicted
of possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and one codefendant was convicted of attempting
to import heroin into the United States. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that the government was not over-involved in the crime and thus did not violate
due process. Although the government, once the informer had enlisted in the defendants'
arrangement for purchase, smuggling and possession of heroin, became extensively involved, its
role was simply facilitating what the defendants had started and were executing.).
118. United States v. Jensen, 69 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 1995) (Defendant was convicted of
laundering money derived from illegal distribution of drugs, and willfully failing to file a report
of cash payments of over $10,000 received in trade or business. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government did not commit a due process violation in
investigating the defendant, who was an automobile sales representative, for money laundering
and failing to report cash transaction of over $10,000. The applicable federal statute permitted
the government agent to tell the defendant that the money being offered for an automobile was
drug money, and defendant's sales to drug dealers and advice to agent on structuring of purchase
undermined any argument that the agent created defendant's criminal design.).
119. People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1978) (State police officers arrested a man
for possession of a controlled substance. The police realized, however, that he was innocent when
the substance proved to be merely caffeine. Nevertheless, the police physically brutalized this
man and convinced him that he was facing a stiff prison sentence unless he became an informer.
He agreed to this demand and called Isaacson, a former drug supplier in Pennsylvania. The
informer cried and pled with Isaacson to help him arrange a drug sale that would enable him to
hire an attorney and make bail. Isaacson initially refused, but the informer persisted and
repeatedly made urgent pleas for help. Once the informer lured Isaacson across the New York
state line for a meeting, the police made the arrest. Isaacson asserted the entrapment defense but
was convicted at his bench trial. His conviction was affirmed on appeal over a strenuous dissent.
The N.Y. Court of Appeals reversed based on the "reprehensible police action" involved in
Issacson's arrest.).
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part test. In fact, these cases by and large reject the outrageous
conduct defense. 2
This statement, along with the dissent's attempt to distinguish the
cases, is flawed. The courts in these cases did not reject the existence
of the defense; they merely declined to find a due process violation
based on the facts of the case before them. The Lively dissent states
that the Shannon court rejected the outrageous conduct defense when
the police had actively participated in the defendant's drug transac-
tion.' The Shannon case, however, was decided by a Missouri
appellate court, and thirteen years earlier another Missouri appellate
court overturned a criminal conviction based on outrageous government
conduct. 2 2  In addition, the same court that decided Shannon
recently reaffirmed its recognition of the outrageous government
conduct defense and set out a test to evaluate police conduct similar to
that of the Lively majority's.1
In citing Harris, the dissent fails to mention the fact that the case
was remanded to determine whether the police conduct in "stacking
charges" against the defendant was a denial of due process. 
124
120. State v. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 31-32, 921 P.2d at 1050-51.
121. Id. at 32, 921 P.2d at 1051.
122. State v. Hohensee, 650 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (The defendant was con-
victed of second degree burglary when he acted as a "lookout" during the break-in of a building.
The other members of the conspiracy were an undercover police officer and two paid informants
with substantial criminal records. The defendant was the only member of the group who did not
know that the police were sponsoring the crime. Further, the owner of the building was unaware
of, nor had he consented to, the break-in. On appeal, the court overturned the defendant's
conviction, holding that the break-in was outrageous based on the illegality of the conduct of the
police officer and informants.).
123. Four factors are used to determine whether government conduct is outrageous:
(1) the manufacture by police of a crime which would not otherwise have occurred, (2)
engagement by police themselves in criminal conduct, (3) use of appeals to humanitarian
instincts, temptation of exorbitant gain or persistent solicitation to overcome the
defendant's unwillingness to engage in the illegal activity, and (4) a desire on the part
of the police to obtain a conviction of the defendant without motive to prevent further
crime or to protect the public. One or more of these factors may be enough to brand
the law enforcement conduct as outrageous.
State v. Pollard, 941 S.W.2d at 834.
124. United States v. Harris, 997 F.2d at 818.
Any definitive rule of law concerning whether a government agent's sale of narcotics to
a known addict constitutes outrageous government conduct would necessarily be flawed.
On many occasions, a government agent might not be able to infiltrate a drug ring and
be taken into the confidence of the illegal entrepreneurs unless he has the authority to
distribute contraband. Necessarily, many of the transactions with dealers are also
transactions with addicts and disallowing such transactions would severely inhibit the
undercover operation (citation omitted).
Therefore, it would be nonsensical to promulgate a rule holding outrageous
government conduct each and every time the government distributed narcotics to a
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Further, the dissent made no mention of the following dicta from the
Harris decision: "[W]e speculate that if a government agent entered
a drug rehabilitation treatment center and sold heroin to a recovering
addict, and the addict was subsequently prosecuted for possession of
a controlled substance, the outrageous government conduct defense
might properly be invoked. '12' The hypothetical example offered by
the Harris court is significantly analogous to the facts of the Lively
case.
The dissent also fails to cite Tucker or Boyd to garner support for
an outright rejection of what it terms "the so-called doctrine of
outrageous government conduct."'1 26  This apparent oversight is
particularly striking considering that one of the chief arguments
advanced by the Tucker court in repudiating the due process defense
is a similar argument advocated by the Lively dissent concerning
separation of powers. 127 The Tucker court methodically sets out to
answer the question it posits: "The issue has always been: What to
do about this conduct and which branch of the government should do
it?"' 12  Because the police are part of the executive branch, it would
follow that they are constrained by limitations set out by the legislature
and ultimately held accountable by the electorate. 129  Additionally,
determining a defendant's subjective predisposition marks the border
at which the courts may determine if government misconduct has
occurred. 30 The Tucker court states:
This line, established by Congress and articulated by the Supreme
Court beginning in Sorrells, is not subject to circumvention on a
case-by-case basis. The mere invocation of the phrase "due
process" does not give the courts license to conduct its [sic] own
"oversight" of police practices ... because entrapment and
predisposition are ordinarily questions for the jury, the line drawn
by Congress and articulated by the Supreme Court ensures that the
known addict.
Conversely, any rule that permits unlimited sales of narcotics to known addicts
would also lack merit. At a certain threshold, the government's conduct would violate
due process.
Id.
125. Id. at 818.
126. State v. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 29, 921 P.2d at 1049.
127. United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d at 1428; Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 30-31, 921 P.2d
at 1050.





jury, as the traditional "defense against arbitrary law enforcement,"
operates as the ultimate check on abuses of executive power."'
In similar fashion, the Lively dissent states:
The judiciary does not have carte blanche to define appropriate
police conduct . . . . [T]he Legislature codified the entrapment
defense in response to public concern over potential law enforcement
abuses. Moreover, "[t]he execution of federal laws under our
Constitution is confined primarily to the Executive Branch of the
Government, subject to applicable constitutional and statutory
limitations and to judicially fashioned rules to enforce those
limitations." The judiciary must be circumspect as it wields its
power to shape police conduct. Where police conduct violates
explicit rights, such as the Fourth Amendment protection against
unwarranted searches and seizures, it is highly appropriate for the
judiciary to proscribe the behavior. However, notions of "funda-
mental fairness" are debatable, and we should act cautiously when
overturning convictions on this principle. 132
These two views are very similar and lend themselves to Justice
Rehnquist's recantation language of Hampton,3 3 specifically, that a
defendant claiming a due process violation at the hands of the police
must demonstrate that a specific right was violated. This view is
adhered to in Rundquist, a decision which the Lively dissent cites.
34
The requirement of identifying a specific constitutional right
violated in order to assert a due process claim, however, was explicitly
disavowed by the Lively majority opinion. 5 As the majority pointed
out, claiming a violation of a specific constitutional right would obviate
the need for a defendant to claim a violation of his or her right to due
process. 136  In addition to claiming a due process violation, Lively
asserted a claim that her right to free exercise of religion was violated
by the government when it planted an informant in her AA/NA
meetings.1' The court declined to address this issue. As a practical
matter, suggesting that a defendant can somehow vindicate herself via
a civil action against the government is somewhat idealistic and ignores
131. Id.
132. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 30-31, 921 P.2d at 1050-51.
133. See supra note 31.
134. State v. Rundquist, 79 Wash. App. at 796-97, 905 P.2d at 927-28.
135. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 20, 921 P.2d at 1045.
136. Id. This was based on the fact that only three justices concurred with Justice
Rehnquist's assertion that the government must violate a specific right of the defendant in
Hampton. See supra note 32.
137. Appellant's Brief at 61-65, Lively (No. 60389-8); Respondent's Brief at 22-32, Lively
(No. 60389-8).
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
the reality that such a person may not have the financial resources to
retain counsel to pursue such claims against the government wrongdoer
who is furnished a taxpayer-funded defense.
118
The Lively dissent attempts to distance the conduct of the police
from that of their informant by implying that the police were not
culpable for the informant's actions. The dissent boldly concludes that
"the police investigation in this case was entirely on the level." '139
The dissent also contends that "[t]he police here had limited knowl-
edge of the informant's activities" and cites testimony by detectives
that they "had very little information regarding the nature of the
informant's relationship with the Defendant."' 4 °
However, as the majority states:
[T]he detectives were in contact with Desai as many as six to twelve
times a day to check on his progress. Desai began attending
AA/NA meetings with the knowledge and approval of the detectives
from the drug unit. He attended these meetings in order to identify
repeat drug addicts continuing to sell illegal drugs."'
Further, the majority notes that, while the informant also testified that
"the detectives approved of the living arrangement," both detectives
testified that "they did not approve and advised Desai not to develop
a close personal relationship with the defendant."' 42
What is undisputed is that the Walla Walla Drug Task Force
Unit entered into a contract with Desai. It would appear that,
regardless of how one would view the conduct of the detectives, they
were responsible for the actions of their informant. Therefore, they
were responsible for Desai's actions.'43 This situation is not unlike
that of an employer being held liable for the tortious conduct of its
employee committed within the scope of the employment.
The dissent also presents an argument which is at the heart of the
public policy considerations in this case. The dissent argues that police
presence at AA/NA meetings is reasonable because of "repeaters" who
are merely attending meetings without any intention of staying sober
and ceasing their criminal activities. 4 4  This argument could have
some general validity, except that, in the present case, the State failed
138. See Valentine, 132 Wash. 2d at 39, 935 P.2d 1313 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
139. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 33, 921 P.2d at 1051.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 6, 921 P.2d at 1038.
142. Id. at 7, 921 P.2d at 1039.
143. See Sherman v. United States, 256 U.S. at 373 ("The government cannot disown [the
informant] and insist it is not responsible for his actions.").
144. 130 Wash. 2d at 33, 921 P.2d at 1046.
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to show how such suspected criminal conduct related to Lively in any
way.14 Without any information concerning Lively's knowledge of
or participation in criminal activity, the wisdom and propriety of
continuing to target her as a criminal suspect is questionable.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The determinative factor in this decision was public policy, and
the factual element of the AA/NA program was a unique one that
justified the court's holding. This argument is supported by the
willingness of the legislature and judiciary to allow some defendants to
receive drug/alcohol treatment as part of, or in lieu of, their sentenc-
es.146 This decision recognizes and affirms the importance of efforts
by citizens to recover from chemical dependency. In fact, the Lively
case marks a rare instance when the harm to an individual citizen's
rights was found to significantly outweigh the public interest of
curbing drug traffic.
It is rather ironic that the factual circumstances of Lively bear a
resemblance to those in one of the leading U.S. Supreme Court
entrapment cases, United States v. Sherman.'47 Both cases concerned
the battle of recovering addicts who, while trying to change their ways,
eventually succumbed to the unsolicited persuasion of an informant,
whose motives and level of supervision varied substantially from those
of an undercover police officer. One particularly striking passage in
Chief Justice Warren's Sherman opinion describes the nature of the
association between the defendant Sherman and the police informant:
"From mere greetings, conversations progressed to a discussion of
mutual experiences and problems, including their attempts to overcome
addiction to narcotics."' 48 It is precisely this sort of activity that
occurs in AA/NA and forms one of its foundations-members sharing
their "experience, strength and hope" with one another to help their
recovery.'49 In Sherman, as well as in Lively, the informant's repeat-
ed requests played upon the defendant's emotions and brought about
145. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 23, 921 P.2d at 1046.
146. 130 Wash. 2d at 26, 921 P.2d at 1048 (Lawmakers in this state have indicated a strong
preference for treatment of drug and alcohol addiction as demonstrated by the deferred
prosecution law, title 10, chapter 05, of the Washington Revised code, State Funding for
Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC), and treatment alternatives such as community
placement options in the sentencing laws, to list but a few examples.).
147. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 369.
148. Id. at 371.
149. ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS XXII (A.A. World Services, Inc., 3rd ed. 1976 [herein-
after ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS].
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acquiescence, which is a far cry from "ready and willing" targets of
undercover drug investigations.
The Lively court balanced the competing interests of (1) the
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may exist at AA/NA
meetings (or that certain attendees may be involved in criminal
activity) with (2) the reasonable expectation of members making a
sincere effort to recover from chemical dependency to be free of undue
influence by government agents. Citizens not involved in criminal
activity and making a good-faith effort to recover from chemical
dependency should reasonably expect that the government will not
interfere with their efforts.
The dissent notes that the government, was acting on information
that there may have been criminal activity at the meetings.50 In
such circumstances, government investigation of a meeting where
criminal activity was occurring may be justified."5 ' It is also clear,
however, that if such criminal activity were occurring, Lively was not
involved. It is equally clear that the informant's continued contact
with Lively was inappropriate and overreaching.
One can argue that those sincerely trying to recover from chemical
dependency are entitled to protection from those not-so-motivated
members who are engaged in criminal activity in the midst of the
fellowships. The fact that AA/NA fellowships prohibit drugs or
alcohol at meetings does not negate a reasonable belief that such
elements may periodically exist. There is no mechanism by which the
fellowships could enforce their policies upon their voluntary member-
ship. Ironically, the most probable source of "potential offenders" in
the meetings are those who are compelled to attend AA/NA by the
courts.
Nonetheless, one could legitimately argue that the government has
an interest in monitoring the conduct of those who are ordered by a
court to attend AA/NA, and, presumably, to follow the fellowship's
policies and procedures. Such monitoring occurs in the form of signed
verification of meeting attendance, which is submitted to the defen-
dant's treatment facility (if he or she is enrolled in one) or probation
officer, which in turn, informs the court that the defendant is
complying with its orders. The practice of planting an informant in an
AA/NA meeting, if at all justifiable, should be restricted to the
150. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 33, 921 P.2d at 1051.
151. The majority decision stated that had Desai attended AA/NA meetings for the pur-
pose of befriending a person previously targeted as a suspect in an investigation, the conduct could
be considered an appropriate police procedure. Id. at 23, 921 P.2d at 1046.
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specific and explicit purpose of investigating ongoing criminal activity
by known persons. It should not be used to establish relations with
random persons and create crime which would otherwise not occur." 2
Certainly, as Lively asserted, there was no compelling interest in the
government's presence at the meetings for the purpose of establishing
a relationship with a member and later inducing her to commit a
crime. 1
53
The ultimate justification for the court's holding in Lively is that
self-help groups such as AA/NA serve a valid public purpose in
helping those who suffer from chemical dependency to achieve and
maintain sobriety. Self-help groups such as AA/NA have been
recognized by the courts as a successful means of treating those
suffering from chemical dependency. 4 Affording the opportunity
for citizens to recover from chemical dependency is also significant
when one considers the amount of crime, physical injury, and property
destruction directly or indirectly traceable to drugs and alcohol. These
crimes include the manufacture and sale of drugs, driving while
intoxicated, crimes committed by addicts seeking money to support
their drug habits, and crimes committed by persons while under the
influence of drugs or alcohol.
Judicial approval of the conduct of the informant in Lively would
be a threat to the integrity of self-help groups, and could result in a
"chilling" effect on their attendance if members were aware that police
agents were free to attend meetings for law enforcement purposes.
While the Lively case only addressed a situation where AA/NA
provided a forum for an informer to establish a relationship with a
152. The State had asserted that:
[T]he informant's attendance at NA or AA meetings in order to locate individuals who
are violating criminal drug laws or who are predisposed to violate criminal drug laws
may not be behavior that should be emulated. The investigative technique, however,
is not unreasonable since AA and NA meetings are attended by numerous people
pursuant to court order, probation officer directive, or merely to make one's spouse,
family, or bosses happy.... This group of people may not have a sincere desire to
become abstinent and to maintain sobriety. ... To the extent that this group of
individuals continue to illegally abuse controlled substances, they endanger our
communities and those individuals who are attending AA and/or NA out of a fervent
desire to improve their lives.
Respondent's Brief at 34-35, Lively (No. 60389-8).
153. See Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 22-23, 921 P.2d at 1046 ("In this case, the informant's
attendance at AA/NA meetings could best be described as 'trolling for targets' for the police
undercover operation.").
154. See Henson v. Employment Security Dept., 113 Wash. 2d 374, 386-87, 779 P.2d 715,
721-22 (1989) (Durham, J., dissenting); Aripa v. Dept. of Social and Health Services, 91 Wash.
2d 135, 141, 588 P.2d 185, 189 (1978). See also Jones v. Smid, 1993 WL 719562, at 7 (S.D.
Iowa 1993).
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group member, there have been cases where AA members have been
compelled to testify against defendants who made incriminating
statements to them while in recovery. 5 ' Some commentators have
advocated that the law even recognize a privilege for members of self-
help groups, much like it does for other confidential relationships, such
as doctor-patient, attorney-client, priest-penitent and spouses.1 6  In
fact, one author asserted that
[i]f Twelve Step Groups do not enjoy a confidential communications
privilege, there is nothing to prevent the police from sending 'moles'
to AA, Narcotics Anonymous, and Al-Anon meetings to identify
present and former drug dealers, spousal abusers or bad check artists
in order to obtain incriminating information from meetings. Such
moles could pose as experienced members willing to be sponsors for
newcomers to gain new members' confidence.5 7
One of the fundamental components of the AA/NA program is
its autonomy."' It is not affiliated with any other organization, law
enforcement or otherwise. The government has already involved itself
in the AA/NA program to a certain extent by compelling citizens to
become members. That it can compel citizens to attend meetings is a
proposition that has been debated. 9 Nevertheless, it is clear that
citizens trying to recover from chemical dependency have the right to
pursue their recovery free from government influence, and the Lively
decision reinforces this notion.
155. State v. Boobar, 637 A.2d 1162, 1168-69 (Me. 1994); Thomas J. Reed, The Futile Fifth
Step: Compulsoay Disclosure of Confidential Communications AmongAlcoholicsAnonymous Members,
70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 693, 693-700 (1996) (discussing the facts of the Boobar case, as well as
an unreported New York case, People v. Cox); Jessica G. Weiner, Comment, "And The Wisdom
To Know the Difference": Confidentiality vs. Privilege in the Self-Help Setting, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
243, 243-46 (1995) (discussing the facts of the People v. Cox case).
156. See Reed, supra note 155, at 693; see Weiner, supra note 155, at 243.
157. See Reed, supra note 155, at 753.
158. ALcoHOLics ANONYMOUS, supra note 147, at XIII-XIV, 563-68; see also Ethan G.
Kalett, Twelve Steps, You're Out (of Prison): .An Evaluation of "Anonymous Programs" as
Alternative Sentences, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 129, 140 (1996).
159. See Michael G. Honeyman, Jr., Note, Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition of Drunk
Driving Probation: When Does It Amount to Establishment of Religion?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 437
(1997); Christopher K. Smith, Note, State Compelled Spiritual Revelation: The First Amendment
and Alcoholics Anonymous as a Condition to Drunk Driving Probation, I WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 299 (1992); Kerr v. Puckett, 967 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of
Paroles, 956 S.W. 478 (Tenn. 1997); Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996); Griffin v.
Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98 (N.Y. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 681 (1997); Feasel v. Willis, 904
F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Tex. 1995); O'Conner v. California, 855 F. Supp. 303 (C.D. Cal. 1994);
Warner v. Orange County Dept. of Probation, 870 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Scarpino v.




It would appear as though the Washington Supreme Court was
forced into a difficult position by a different "totality of circumstanc-
es." This case reached the high court because one or more of the
parties involved did not exercise proper discretion. The lack of
discretion of the state's informant was self-evident. What is not as
clear from the facts is the extent of the knowledge that police and
prosecutors had concerning the methods employed by the informant as
he targeted Lively. Nevertheless, the police and prosecutors, in an
exercise of their discretion, chose to proceed in obtaining a conviction
against Lively.
While the trial judge could have overruled the finding of the jury
as a matter of law, the due process defense was not presented at
trial-the entrapment defense was and it failed. While the trial judge
declined to nullify the jury's verdict by dismissing the charges under
the court's supervisory power, he instead made findings of fact to
support his departure from the sentencing guidelines in passing an
exceptionally lenient sentence. It would appear that the trial judge,
who obviously disagreed with the jury's evaluation of the evidence and
subsequent verdict, was taking the opportunity to put findings of fact
in the record that would support Lively's case if an appeal was made.
To that end, he was successful.
The dissent seems to imply that the defendant should have just
taken her conviction and lenient sentence and been happy with it. 60
Instead of reversing Lively's conviction, the court could have remanded
her case to a lower court for further proceedings. However, given the
amount of judicial resources already expended on this case, the
Supreme Court's action was appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, "outrageous" is likely to be what average, taxpaying
citizens would exclaim if they heard a recitation of the facts of this
case.' 6' In light of common governmental claims of scarce resources
to fight crime, many citizens would find devoting resources toward
convincing a recovering addict to obtain drugs for the purpose of
arresting her to be "outrageous." They would be outraged to know
that their tax dollars went toward the compensation of the informant,
160. Lively, 130 Wash. 2d at 34, 921 P.2d at 1052.
161. Not unlike a definition of conduct constituting the tort of outrage, stating that "the
case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would
arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!''
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cnt. d (1965).
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whose activities led to further expenditure of judicial resources for the
prosecution and appeal of this case.
Judicial recognition of the defense of entrapment was a response
to the assertion that a defendant should have recourse against
overzealous police practices, and enough cases had shown that such
practices were actually occurring. While codifying an entrapment
statute may have signified a legislative recognition of the same
principle, the emergence of a due process-based defense of outrageous
government conduct demonstrates that there are practical limitations
on the entrapment defense. Specifically, the government may employ
any method it chooses in investigating "predisposed" defendants
because his or her rights cannot be vindicated in court.'62
Until the U.S. Supreme Court clarifies its position on the
outrageous government conduct defense, state and federal courts can
handle such claims as they deem appropriate in particular situations.
Thus, while these courts may not define "outrageous government
conduct" with any sort of precision or consistency, they may be
confronted with a case, as the Washington Supreme Court was, when
they will "know it when they see it."
162. Russell, 411 U.S. at 443-44 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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